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Abstract 
A recent set of empirical works highlights a puzzling asymmetric response of labor market 
outcomes to the corporate tax. This paper explores a potential source of this disparity, using 
differentials in profit accounting rules across U.S. states. I exploit policy discontinuities at state 
borders by pairing counties in states featuring a tax change with their contiguous counterparts in 
control states. I notice that corporate tax cuts do not boost employment while tax hikes reduce job 
creation. The incidence of tax increases on employment seems limited in states with a single sales 
factor apportionment formula and pronounced in states that use a triple factor apportionment rule. 
I present a basic conceptual framework that explains this pattern.  
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1. Introduction 
The theory of public finance has contributed a substantial amount of literature to the analysis of 
the corporate tax incidence (Harberger 1962, Grubert and Mutti 1985, Gravelle and Smetters 2006, 
Randolph 2006, Gravelle 2008). Recently, a series of empirical works questioned the implicit 
implications of a symmetric response of labor market outcomes to the corporate tax (Ljungqvist 
and Smolyansky 2014, Fuest et.al 2017). This behavioral oddity which I refer to as the “corporate 
tax asymmetry puzzle” is one of the main objectives of this analysis. I relate the incidence of the 
corporate tax to state apportionment rules, with the goal of understanding the sources of the above-
mentioned puzzle. First, I notice that corporate tax cuts do not boost employment while tax hikes 
reduce job creation. The incidence of tax increases on employment seems negligible in states with 
a single sales factor apportionment formula and pronounced in states that use a multiple factor 
apportionment rule. I present a basic theoretical model that partially explains these patterns. To 
identify these effects, I adopt a spatial discontinuity approach that compares counties straddling a 
state borderline around tax policy reforms. 
Specifically, a one percentage point increase in a state’s effective corporate tax rate significantly 
reduces the growth of employment by 0.21 percentage point. However, state corporate tax cuts do 
not bear any significant impact on job creation. The magnitude of the incidence of a business tax 
hike on employment is not quite meaningful in states using a single sales factor apportionment but 
rises significantly to -0.29 percentage point in states using a multiple factor apportionment 
formula. I expose a basic theoretical framework to explain the disparity of the incidence of a 
corporate tax increase across states with different accounting rules.   
The empirical literature could be characterized by two different lines of argument. The critical 
methodological challenge remains the validity of the parallel trend assumption across the studied 
units. Contributions of the likes of Djankov et al. (2006) or Carroll (2009), build on the neoclassical 
tradition and focus on the of the impact of the tax operating through factor reallocations between 
corporate and non-corporate sectors (indirect effects). In contrast, a rather heterodox approach 
emerged recently and measure the so-called “direct effect” of the tax. The proponents of this school 
emphasize the importance of labor market institutions and market imperfections in the analysis of 
the incidence. Most notable are market power (Liu and Altshuler 2013) and imperfect labor market 
(Felix et al. 2009 and Devereux et al. 2010). Both schools implicitly treat the incidence as 
symmetric meaning that the magnitude of the effect of a corporate rate cut is similar to that of a 
rate increase in absolute value. Recently, this presumption came under scrutiny with a couple of 
empirical works that documented (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014, Fuest et.al 2017) a potential 
asymmetric response. 
This paper exploits corporate tax reforms across states in the U.S. to investigate the relationship 
between the corporate tax, employment, and tax accounting rules specifically apportionment 
formulas. I investigate the employment sensitivity to the tax and explore the importance of single 
vs multiple factor apportionment rules in the differential response of job creation to business 
taxation. This investigation differs from other similar empirical works on the topic (Goolsbee & 
Maydew 2001, Gupta & Hofmann 2003) in that it uses a different identification strategy and 
compares the two broadly defined regimes of apportionment. I restrict the analysis to contiguous 
counties (straddling across state borders) which share similar economic conditions and are more 
likely to provide ideal controls for tax changes on either side of the border.  
3 
 
While this approach has been used previously in labor economics to study the effects of minimum 
wage legislation (Card and Krueger, 1994, 2000 and Dube et al. 2010), only Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky (2014) adopted it in the context of corporate taxation. I use the same identification 
strategy but explore the tax effects in the short-run. I also describe a basic theoretical framework 
that underscores the mechanics at play and sheds more light on the empirical findings. 
My research advances the literature on corporate taxation in multiple ways. First, the spatial 
discontinuity identification strategy attempts to address one of the recurrent caveats of existing 
empirical studies on the topic by controlling for pre-existing trends in employment across different 
geographies. Previous works at the state-level only controlled for the time-invariant source of 
heterogeneity. By focusing on neighboring counties (like Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014) with 
similar economic conditions, I compare a county in a state with a corporate tax change to a control 
twin county on the other side of the border.  
Second and importantly, even though profit-shifting across national borders has attracted a great 
amount of empirical works (Huizinga and Laeven 2008, Bartelsman et al. 2003, Clausing 2003), 
very few papers considered how this consideration plays out within the same country. Different 
financial accounting rules across jurisdictions within the same country favor tax minimization 
practices, that could reinforce the deadweight loss of a corporate tax reform. Mintz and Smart 
(2003) noticed that Canadian firms minimize provincial corporate tax liabilities through a variety 
of financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates; while Klassen and Shackelford (1998) 
observed that regional corporate tax collections in the U.S and Canada are concave in tax rates, 
consistent with firms shifting their tax bases to favorable jurisdictions. There is widespread 
evidence supporting the claim that formula apportionment rules in corporate profit taxation affect 
incentives to shift income (Gordon and Wilson 1986, Nielsen and Raimondos-Moller 2001, Hines 
2009) through transfer pricing notably. Little documented though, is the impact these state rules 
have on investment (Gupta and Hofmann 2003) or employment (Goolsbee and Maydew 2001, 
Clausing 2016), notwithstanding a well-established theoretical background.  
I consider the role of state rulings regarding corporate profit accounting, in the response of 
employment to the tax. To the best of my knowledge, only Goolsbee and Maydew (2001) and 
Clausing (2016) explore a similar question with employment, though the authors did not focus on 
the two main apportionment regimes. The majority of U.S corporations operate in multiple states 
and are subject to different treatments of profits earned in other jurisdictions. Most states use an 
apportionment formula based on sales, employment, and property to break down the portion of a 
corporation’s profits to be taxed. After explaining how these rulings matter for a corporation trying 
to minimize tax liabilities, I explore how labor demand respond to these legislations in the face of 
a corporate tax increase.     
Third, and not the least, measuring the corporate tax rate has been a challenging exercise. Many 
papers use the statutory tax rate (Hassett and Hubbard 1996, Carroll 2009, Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky 2014 and Hassett and Mathur 2010) which features some limitations. Provisions 
available at the state level such as the deductibility of some costs could substantially lower the 
effective tax burden on firms. As a result, others prefer an effective tax rate (Laura Vartia 2008, 
Djankov et al. 2006 and Liu and Altshuler 2013) measured as a user cost of capital investment. I 
use an effective state corporate tax measure that was initially constructed by Wilson and Chirinko 
up to 2006. I extend the effective tax series to 2014, by collecting additional information on the 
deductibility of federal tax payments from state corporate tax liabilities. The extended dataset 
4 
 
which is available upon request captures the deductibility of federal tax liabilities in the 
measurement of the tax burden for firms.         
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic theoretical framework to 
underscore how apportionment rules affect employment choices across states. Section 3 explores 
the policy context with a description of state tax accounting rules in the U.S. Section 4 describes 
the methodology and empirical strategy, while section 5 presents the data. Section 6 analyzes the 
main results and section 7 examines the robustness of these findings to alternative methodological 
considerations. Section 8 highlights the limitations of the study and explores the avenues for future 
research. 
2. Conceptual framework 
The model described below considers a multistate corporation facing several rules when filing 
taxes across different states. Most states use an apportionment rule to determine the share of 
aggregate corporate income taxable within their boundaries. Currently, a majority of states use a 
single sales factor apportionment rule with the breakdown of taxable income within the state being 
measured on the basis of sales in the state. Alternatively, other states use a formula that involves 
sales, employment (or payroll), and property.  
The model presented below considers the incentives a multistate firm faces when allocating 
employment across states. Assume away trade frictions, transportation or production relocation 
costs and consider that labor and capital are perfectly mobile across states. This implies that 
production in a specific location is not constrained by sales, while wage and interest rates are 
equalized across jurisdictions. Suppose for simplicity that aggregate profits Π is measured 
uniformly across states. This hypothesis is inconsequential with regards to the results derived 
below. I will respectively consider how (i) a multiple-factor and (ii) a single sales apportionment 
rules affect the allocation of employment across states when corporate tax rates are altered.  
Suppose that the multistate corporation operates in n states and let Si, Ei, Ki, and Pi refer to sales, 
employment, capital and property of the corporation in state i while S, E, K and P
 
represent the 
aggregated (national) equivalents of the same variables. αi measures the generosity of the tax code 
with respect to the deductibility of capital expenditures in state i and θis represents the weight for 
factor s in the apportionment rule in state i. These weights are obviously constrained to lie between 
zero and one. For a corporation, tax payments in state i are given by:      
i i i
i i i1 i2 i1 i2
S E PT τ θ θ (1 θ θ )
S E P
 
= Π + + − −  
   with 
j=n
j j j j j j
j=1
F(K ,E )-wE α τ rKΠ = −                               (1) 
Equation (1) carries important implications with respect to the way one should think about the 
corporate tax. First, since payroll costs are deductible from aggregate profits, the corporate tax can 
be treated as a subsidy to employment regardless of the jurisdiction where it is being allocated. To 
see this, consider the marginal impact of a one-unit increase in employment in state j≠i (holding 
aggregate employment unchanged) on the corporation’s tax liabilities in state i.  
i i i i
i i1 i2 i1 i2
j
T S E P
τ w θ θ (1 θ θ ) 0
E S E P
∂  
= − + + − − ≤ ∂  
                                                                                         (2) 
Second, the three-factor formula apportionment rule implicitly defines a tax on employment, sales, 
and property respectively in state i. To see why rearrange the expression for tax liabilities in 
equation (1) as follows: 
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i i1 i i i2 i i i1 i2 i iT θ τ S θ τ E (1 θ θ ) τ PS E P
 Π Π Π      
= + + − −      
      
                                                                          (3) 
This version of equation (1) clearly indicates that the corporate tax should be treated as a partial 
tax on employment in state i (McClure 1980, Serrato and Zidar 2016). Holding sales and property 
fixed, it appears immediately that the corporation would like to minimize employment in states 
with high tax rates. Two main insights can be drawn from equations (2) and (3). Higher tax rates 
in a given state i induce countervailing effects on a multistate firm’s employment in that state.  
The first effect which is not distortionary relates to the higher subsidy the greater corporate tax 
would allow the corporation to deduct no matter where employment is being counted. Holding 
aggregate employment E, sales S, and property P unchanged, this employment subsidy will 
encourage the firm to move employment to the state with a higher tax rate. The second force 
operates in opposite direction to the first. A high tax rate in state i implies that the implicit tax on 
employment is higher in that state, which would provide incentives to move employment in lower 
tax jurisdictions. The effect that prevails out of the two will dictate how employment responds to 
corporate rate changes in the presence of a three-factor apportionment formula. To formalize this 
argument, consider the marginal effect of the corporate rate on tax payments by a corporation in a 
given state i. 
i i i i
i1 i2 i1 i2
i
T S E P
θ θ (1 θ θ )
τ S E P
∂  
= Π + + − − ∂  
                                                                                                       (4) 
Next, taking the derivative of this marginal effect with respect to employment in state i yields1:   
i i2 i2
i i i
T θ θ
w
E τ E E E
 ∂∂ ∂Π Π 
= Ω + Π = Ω −   ∂ ∂ ∂ Ω  
  with  i i ii1 i2 i1 i2
S E P
θ θ (1 θ θ )
S E P
 Ω = + + − − 
 
             (5) 
It follows from this derivation that i
i i
T 0
E τ
 ∂∂ ≥ ∂ ∂ 
 if  i2θ wE W≥ =
Ω Π Π
                                                   (6) 
In other words, as long as condition (6) holds the impact of the corporate tax on tax liabilities in 
state i would be higher if the corporation employs a greater share of its employees in the considered 
state. Condition (6) simply states that for the incidence of the tax on the corporation’s liabilities in 
a given jurisdiction to be increasing in the level of employment in the state, the relative weight of 
employment in the apportionment formula used should exceed the aggregate wage share of the 
firm’s profits.  
To further illustrate this point, think of the wage-aggregate profits ratio as a reflexion of the 
benefits of a tax increase for the corporation, due to higher deductions in state i. On the other side, 
the corporate tax hike is costly to the firm and that cost depends upon the apportionment formula. 
When too much weight is attached to employment in this formula, the ensuing cost is borne in a 
greater proportion by employment. To fix ideas, let think about the range of values associated with 
each of the parameters in condition (6). With a uniform formula apportionment rule θi2 equals one-
third and as long as we assume that the corporate firm operates across a large set of states, Ω should 
reasonably be smaller than θi2 implying that the left-hand side should be higher than one. With 
regard to the right-hand side of condition (6), recent data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
indicate that profits have been rising relative to workers’ compensation reaching an all-time high 
                                                          
1
 I am holding aggregate employment E fixed here. I am only interested in how the rate change affects incentives to shuffle 
employment across states to minimize tax liabilities. 
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level of 1.8 in 2015. This suggests that the right-hand side of condition (6) is probably less than 
one today, though it used to be much higher a few decades ago. As a result, condition (6) would 
hold probably true today in this simplistic scenario. I predict that in the face of a corporate rate 
increase, corporations would move labor to a different state to cushion the costs induced by the 
profit loss (condition 6 holds).     
With a single sales factor apportionment formula, the previous derivations become: 
i
i i
ST τ
S
 
= Π   
,   
i i
i
T S
τ S
∂  
= Π  ∂  
 and  i i
i i
T S
w 0
E τ S
 ∂∂  
= − ≤   ∂ ∂   
                                                                   (7) 
This formula implies that with sales being the only factor that determines tax payments in state i, 
a domestic corporate tax increase provides a higher subsidy (-wτi vs -wτiSi/S) to employment both 
at home and elsewhere. However, the subsidy is lower at home than it is abroad. The impact of a 
tax increase on the corporation’s liabilities is limited in states where the firm employs a greater 
share of its workforce, implying that one should not expect a large employment destruction in this 
scenario. Plus, if domestic sales are relatively important, there should not be an incentive to lower 
employment in state i, given that the subsidy approaches what it is in other jurisdictions.  I predict 
that in states with a single sales factor apportionment rule, corporate rate increases should not 
translate into substantial disemployment effects.  
I am also aware of other considerations that might alter the incentives described in this section. 
For instance, the presence of combined reporting and throw-back or throw-out rules will likely 
play a significant role in the way corporations react to changes in business income taxation. These 
policies affect the corporate aggregate profits Π or the weight share of each factor in the 
apportionment formula.  
3. Policy background 
3.1 Why study state corporate tax changes? 
Given that the federal corporate tax has not changed much since over the period 1986-2014, 
exploiting differences across states offers a greater deal of variation in the fiscal treatment of 
corporate profits over time. To illustrate these dynamics, I graph the average effective top marginal 
tax rates over time. Averaged across states, tax rates increased from 3.7% in 1960 to a high of 
7.0% in 1993 and have since fallen to 6.5% in 2014, the lowest it has been since 1981. Only seven 
states have lower tax rates in 2014 than they did in 1960; 36 have higher tax rates.  
For instance, of all the states with a corporate tax in 1960, New Jersey imposed the lowest rate 
(1.7%) while Idaho’s rate of 9.5% was the highest in the country. This pattern persisted up until 
1965 with Idaho increasing its rate by one percentage point and New Jersey maintaining its 
corporate rate identical. However, by 2014 New Jersey had moved above the national average with 
a 9.0% rate while Idaho is now located in the middle of the pack with a 7.4% rate after hitting an 
all-time low of 6.0% in the early 70s. In the meantime, Iowa which was part of the lowest quintile 
in 1960 has become the state with the highest rate in 2014 (12.0%) above Pennsylvania (9.9%) 
and DC (9.9%). In contrast, Ohio which did not have a corporate tax in place in 1960, has moved 
to the bottom of the pack in 2014 with the lowest rate of 0.3%, after hitting a record of 8.9% in the 
mid-80s. 
Before the rise of economic liberalism in the early 1980s, the typical state is about twelve times 
more likely to feature a corporate tax increase than a decrease in any given year. This disparity is 
also associated with substantial differences in rate changes. Prior to 1980, the regular state 
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corporate tax cut averages 0.6 percentage point while the usual tax increase averages 1.1 
percentage point. As a result, there is an upward trend in the average state corporate tax rate over 
the period 1964-1980 (See Figure 1). In contrast, following the two major tax legislations2 in the 
1980s, there was a reversal in the frequency of business tax hikes and reductions.  
Over the period 1988-2014, there are about three state tax cuts as opposed to one tax increase on 
average in a given year. Relatedly, the average rate cut substantially increased (from 0.6 percent 
to 1.0 percent) while the average rate hike barely changed (from 1.1 percent to 1.0 percent). This 
combination of factors explains the moderate downward trend observed on the average corporate 
tax rate curve over the period 1988-2014. It could also be linked to the growing extent of tax 
competition between states, as evidenced by multiple empirical studies. This features a narrowing 
of the divergence of the taxation of capital across U.S. states.   
 
 Figure 1: Average effective state corporate rates  
 
 
However, state tax reforms are not random and could be motivated by the business cycle which 
itself affects labor market outcomes such as employment. Even if state tax changes were random, 
disentangling the change in employment that is attributable to the tax poses critical methodological 
challenges. 
3.2 A note on state taxable income  
U.S corporations operate in multiple states with different rules regarding the definition of taxable 
income. From the perspective of tax authorities, this creates a challenge, particularly with tax 
optimization incentives. The literature on tax minimization considerably studied how 
multinational businesses take advantage of existing differentials in tax rates and rules to maximize 
aggregate profits. The same consideration carries to the regional level since political jurisdictions 
in the U.S.  treat business income differently. Most states use an apportionment formula to measure 
tax liabilities within their boundaries. I identify four main regimes of apportionment used by states: 
(i) single sales-factor (ii) three-factor with uniform weight, (iii) three factors with sales double, 
and (iv) three factors with variation in each weight. 
There is substantial variation in the rules used to measure profits across states and over time. As 
of 2016, 24 states use a single sales-factor, 6 states use a uniform triple factor rules, 10 states use 
a three-factor formula with sales double-weighted, 4 states have no income tax, the remaining 
states use triple-factor schemes with variations in the weight attributed to each component. The 
                                                          
2
 Economic Recovery Tax Act in 1981 and Tax Reform Act in 1986 
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pre-eminence of sales as a basis for business income taxation has not always been quite as strong. 
For instance, back in 1983, only eight states assigned a weight greater than one-third on sales. This 
number jumped up to 31 by 2000. This trend has implications regarding the response of 
employment to corporate tax reforms over time. Besides, there are other differences across states 
with respect to the measurement of profits. 
The combined reporting agreement first adopted in 1983 by 16 U.S states, requires corporations 
to account in their aggregate earnings, profits from the parent and all affiliated subsidiaries of the 
multistate corporation. Even though I do not consider the role such policies would have on the 
demand for labor demand, I report in the robustness checks, results for sub-samples of states with 
combined reporting legislation. The variation in consolidated profit reporting laws provides an 
additional dimension along which activity or shifting incentives differ.  
Plus, given that a few states do not tax corporate income and there is a disparity in the way 
corporate profits are measured across states, some jurisdictions instituted throwback and throwout 
rules. The goal is to set a clear treatment for untaxed income. These rulings could also impact the 
labor demand response to a corporate tax reform since they would affect Π in the conceptual 
framework.    
4. Methodology 
4.1 Identification strategy: spatial discontinuity  
A key challenge for many econometric studies to control for unobservable factors that vary over 
time, especially when those factors are restricted to a certain geographic space. Since it is hard to 
observe appropriate counterfactual trends against which to compare tax treated states, some studies 
consider non-treated states as controls (Felix and Hines 2009 and Djankov et. al 2006). This 
approach would lead to biased estimates if the parallel trend assumption does not hold across states. 
To circumvent this potential source of endogeneity, I focus exclusively on contiguous counties 
because state tax reforms are exogenous from the perspective of a county. 
Unobservable time-varying determinants of employment related to climate variations, access to 
transportation networks or agglomeration economies are difficult to quantify or control for at the 
county level. However, these factors are more likely to be similar within a pair of contiguous 
counties, which implies that comparing these counties over time could help minimize the bias 
created by such unobserved heterogeneous patterns.  
The use of contiguous counties to study the effects of public policy is not new in the literature. 
This approach draws on the twin-unit empirical strategy which controls for individual unobserved 
ability by comparing outcomes across two identical units. The contiguous county methodology 
used in this paper consists of matching each geographic unit with its neighboring counterpart and 
considers that proximity increases homogeneity through trade, mobility and the benefits of 
agglomeration economies.  
The integration of labor and product markets favor the development of local economies between 
contiguous counties. This results in similar employment growth patterns over the long-run. 
Businesses on either side of the border have access to an extended local demand and workers could 
work on both sides of the border. Given that identification rests critically on the assumption that 
contiguous counties are homogenous due to their geographic proximity, I focus on closer counties 
(distance between centers of gravity less than 100 miles) in the robustness checks.  
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A significant body of empirical works use this spatial discontinuity identification approach to study 
the impact of policy changes on economic outcomes. These include (Card and Krueger 1994 and 
Dube et al. 2010) on the minimum wage, Chirinko and Wilson (2008) on tax-induced changes in 
the user cost of capital, Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2014) on corporate tax changes and Rocco 
Huang (2008) on deregulation in the financial sector. Though the identification strategy is the 
same, these papers adopt different econometric specifications ranging from county group effects 
in panel regressions (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014) to contiguous matching (Rocco Huang 
2008 and Chirinko and Wilson 2008).  
I use a methodology identical to Rocco Huang (2008) and compare the average growth of 
employment between a pair of contiguous counties before and after a state corporate tax change. I 
only consider isolated tax changes in order to identify the tax impact. Specifically, I focus on tax 
changes that are neither preceded nor followed by other tax changes in a window of three years 
prior to or after the considered event. Therefore, this paper compares average growth rates of 
employment between a pair of contiguous counties, over the three years preceding an isolated tax 
change to the same average over a window of three years after the change. This approach which 
consists of pooling several event studies is justified by econometric considerations that I describe 
below.  
4.2 Why use an event study approach?  
This paper pools several corporate tax change events across states. The tax impact is derived from 
a difference in difference approach. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) suggest that using 
a panel structure in a difference in difference identification approach underestimates standard 
errors in the presence of serially correlated dependent variables like employment. They do not find 
econometric corrections that place a specific parametric form on the time-series process to correct 
the problem. Nevertheless, they prove that comparing averages over periods before and after policy 
reforms works well.  
I follow the same methodology by comparing average employment growth before and after a set 
of corporate tax changes between pairs of contiguous counties. Like Rocco Huang (2008), I choose 
a three-year period to strike a reasonable balance between the time span of the data structure and 
economic theory. However, I also explore the sensitivity of the results with alternative windows. 
This paper defines the control and treatment units along with the “pre” and “post” treatment 
periods as follows: 
•  “Pre-” Period: This period covers a span of three years before one of the two counties 
straddling a given border segment experiments a tax change. During this period, both states 
did not implement a corporate tax change suggesting that there was no corporate tax 
treatment. Both counties in a contiguous pair were not treated in the sense of a corporate 
tax reform but could be subjected to other policy changes. The main goal here is to control 
for any pre-existing trend in the outcome of interest. 
 
• “Post-” Period: Like the “pre” treatment, this period covers a span of three years during 
which one of the two states changed its corporate tax reform, but the other state did not. 
The county located on the side of the border featuring the tax reform is part of the treatment 
group while its contiguous counterpart on the other side of the border serves as a control. 
Comparing the growth of employment over this treatment period will help to capture the 
tax incidence.   
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4.3 Are contiguous counties good controls? 
I check the validity of the identification strategy by comparing contiguous county pairs over the 
year preceding an isolated state corporate tax reform. Comparing the absolute difference in growth 
of population, employment and income during these years, I intend to verify if neighboring 
counties located on the other side of a state borderline represent a better control for a contiguous 
county. If these counties approximate observable economic characteristics of a specific county 
more than all other counties, then using them as controls could be justified.  
In the table below, I compare the average absolute difference in employment, population and 
personal income growth between counties located across a state borderline and their contiguous 
counterparts to the same difference between these counties and all other counties. The results in 
table 1 suggest that contiguous counties are much closer to their neighboring counties than they 
are to other counties in terms of demographic and economic growth opportunities. I also report the 
standard deviations to emphasize the variation of the differences between the two groups. 
Table 1: Growth differentials with contiguous counties vs. all counties (%) 
 
 growth measured as a percentage change relative to the previous year 
Average on absolute value of growth differences 
4.4 Empirical strategy 
The following analysis has several objectives. First, it describes the estimation approach used in 
this paper. It also describes the assumptions related to the error terms and details the standard error 
clustering methodology. Finally, the section explains how the potential presence of spatial 
correlations is addressed.  
4.4.1 Estimation method 
The primary identification assumption of this paper consists of comparing contiguous counties 
which are plausibly similar except for the differentials in corporate tax treatment. For a pair of 
contiguous counties i and j, the following system of equations represents the starting point. The 
dependent variable gipt(gjpt) refers to the growth of employment while Xipt(Xjpt) represents a set of 
covariates measured over the period t for county i(j) belonging to the contiguous pair p. τ refers to 
the corporate tax variable which is the effective tax rate obtained from Chirinko and Wilson (2008).  
The term ηpt is critical as it ensures that a pair of contiguous counties shares a similar time variant 
unobserved heterogeneity. θi(j) represents the time-invariant county specific effect. Period t in this 
specification refers to a three-year span and the growth variable measures the average growth rate 
over this time span.
 
Avg. Diff. Growth Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Employment Cont. Counties 0.006 0.009 0.0003 0.0439
All other Counties 0.012 0.012 0.0004 0.0431
Population Cont. Counties 0.003 0.003 0.0003 0.0148
All other Counties 0.009 0.005 0.0015 0.0209
Income Cont. Counties 0.010 0.014 0.0003 0.0651
All other Counties 0.023 0.020 0.0016 0.0947
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ip t i it pt ip t ip t
jpt j jt p t jp t jp t
g α θ +βτ η δX ε
g α θ βτ η δX ε
= + + + +
= + + + + +
                                                                                                                (8) 
To identify the employment response to the corporate tax change, I difference this equation twice. 
First, to eliminate the unobserved time-invariant county level heterogeneity, I take the first 
difference for each of the counties in the set of equations (1) around a tax change. This results in 
the set of equations (2) which compares the average growth of employment three years prior to the 
tax reform to the same average three years after.  
ipt it pt ipt ipt
jpt jt pt jpt jpt
g β τ η δ X ε
g β τ η δ X ε
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
                                                                                                                  (9) 
The first difference wipes out any time-invariant heterogeneity at the county or state level. 
Counties have different averages of employment growth due to county-specific characteristics 
such as the presence of natural resources or initial per capita income which do not vary much over 
time. Also, many legislations or rules which are set up at the state level affect county economic 
patterns, but they barely change over time. The time difference eliminates such heterogeneous 
state characteristics.   
However, since this first difference still includes a time-variant heterogeneity component within 
the pair, I further refine the estimation method by subtracting the two equations in the set (2). This 
results in equation (3) which is the final specification used in all our regressions. Even though 
empirical studies using panels, control for the time-invariant heterogeneity in labor market 
outcomes, they generally fail to consider the differential dynamics across regions. Differencing 
twice allows us to eliminate the two sources of endogeneity in this type of analysis.  
ipt jpt it jt ipt jpt ipt jpt( - )=β( τ - τ )+δ( X - X )+( ε ε )g g∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆  or equivalently 
p p p p
t ipt t it t ipt t ipty =β τ +δ X + ε∆ ∆ ∆ ∆                                                                                                                                          (10) 
4.4.2 Standard errors 
The estimation method of this paper entails significant relationships between errors across 
contiguous counties belonging to the same state on the one hand but also between pairs straddling 
the same border segment on the other side. Given that a county could be paired with several other 
counties located across a border portion, and state corporate tax changes affect all counties in a 
state, the error terms are related along several dimensions. The following hypotheses relate to these 
linkages between the disturbance processes, as well as the classical orthogonality condition 
between regressors and errors.      
A1: ipt jqsE(ε ε ) 0 for i, j  ≠ in pairs p and q ∈ the same state (S) or the same border segment (B)  
A2: ipt jqsE(ε ,ε ) 0 for i, j=  in pairs p and q ∉ the same state and ∉ the same border segment  
A3: ipt jpt ipt jtE(ε ,X ) E(ε , τ ) 0  = = for i=j or i,j∈  the same county pair 
Assumption A3 stipulates that unexpected shocks occurring in a county that is part of a contiguous 
pair are unrelated to corporate tax rates and the set of regressors in either of the counties. This 
implies the absence of spatial spillovers to some extent. If businesses located in a treated county 
reacts to the tax by shifting production to the other side of the border, and this triggers household 
migrating or commuting to the other side of the border, tax rate shocks in a county could influence 
population growth in the adjacent county. Even though these behavioral reactions are much limited 
in the short-run, I explore this possibility as a sensitivity check. 
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To account for these interdependencies, the error terms are clustered along two dimensions: state 
and border segment. I use the code written by Mitchell Petersen (2006) based on the formula 
provided by Cameron and Miller (2006) for non-nested two-way clustering in their paper "Robust 
inference with multi-way clustering". The methodology underlying this approach is exposed in the 
appendix.     
4.4.3 Regression specifications 
The main dependent variable used in all the specifications is the growth of employment (gemppt), 
though I report results for personal income. As control variables, I include the traditional 
determinants of employment in the literature, for which I could gather time series data at the county 
level over the period of analysis. In addition to the corporate tax (effcitpt), the analysis controls for 
the growth of population (gpoppt) and the number of establishments (firmspt). To capture time 
variant heterogeneity at the state level, I include the average growth of employment in the interior 
contiguous counties (gempcpt).  
If as suggested by a few empirical works on the corporate tax (Ljungqvist & Smolyansky 2014, 
Fuest et al. 2017), the response of employment (or wages) to the taxation of profits is asymmetric, 
then one ought to consider the possibility of an asymmetric incidence of tax cuts and tax hikes 
separately in the analysis of the incidence. I distinguish two panels of regressions. The first panel 
of regressions described in equation (11) combines all tax events without distinction.  
p p p p p p
t pt 1 t pt 1 t pt 2 t cpt 3 t pt t ptgemp β effcit δ gpop δ gemp +δ firms ε  ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆                                             (11) 
The second panel highlighted in equations (12) and (13) respectively restricts the analysis to tax 
cuts and hikes events. 
p p p p p p
t pt 1 t pt 1 t pt 2 t cpt 3 t pt t ptgemp β effcit δ gpop δ gemp δ firms ε  
−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆                                         (12)  
p p p p p p
t pt 2 t pt 1 t pt 2 t cpt 3 t pt t ptgemp β effcit +δ gpop δ gemp δ firms ε   
+∆ = ∆ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆                                        (13)  
In addition, each regression in the second panel is estimated on different samples of border 
segments. I respectively consider (a) all pairs of contiguous counties, (b) pairs for which treatment 
occurs in the county with a single sales factor apportionment rule and (c) pairs for which treatment 
occurs in the county with a multiple-factor apportionment rule. Though the weight attached to 
employment in this latter category varies widely, I chose to aggregate these schemes due to the 
complexity of the formula used in some states and limitations of the dataset. For sub-samples (b) 
and (c), the analysis focuses on corporate tax increases even if all results are reported. 
5. Data Sources and samples 
In this section, I describe the data used, the samples of tax events and border segments considered 
in this paper. First, I describe the general structure of U.S state corporate tax systems. Later, I 
present the sources of the data as well as the main variables used in the regressions. Finally, I 
analyze changes in state corporate tax rates over the period 1964-2014. 
5.1 Structure of U.S state corporate tax systems 
On top of the federal corporate income tax, most U.S. states impose a tax on the profits of firms 
operating within their jurisdiction. Of the 50 states, only Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington and Wyoming do not tax corporations as separate productive units in 2014 but treat 
them as pass-through entities. Texas and Washington impose a business sales tax identical to a 
value-added tax, irrespective of the legal form of organization.  
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Given the identification strategy which compares contiguous counties, I exclude Hawaii and 
Alaska which are not located on the Mainland U.S territory. Also, I include all states even those 
that do not tax corporations separately. These non-corporate tax states could still represent good 
controls for tax changes in their neighboring counterparts. 
The tax schedule is not linear in most states, and provisions are made with regards to the 
deductibility of federal tax payments in some states. Most of the literature on corporate tax 
incidence uses the highest bracket of the schedule to capture the burden of the tax on firms 
(Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014 and Felix and Hines 2009). I follow the same approach in this 
paper but use an effective state corporate tax rate that was initially compiled by Chirinko and 
Wilson (2008). 
5.2 Data sources 
This paper relies on the comparison of employment variations between contiguous counties around 
exogenous corporate tax reform. Of the 3,142 counties and county equivalents existing in the U.S., 
3109 are located on the mainland U.S. territory. In total, I consider 978 different counties 
belonging to 2384 county pairs over the period 1969-2014. 
The Census Bureau through the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) platform 
provides detailed county-level data on employment going back to 1970. The dataset is published 
on a quarterly basis and covers 98% of employers surveyed by the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW). The Bureau also reports population statistics at the county level 
at the annual time step going back to 1969. 
The QCEW data are derived from quarterly tax reports submitted to State workforce agencies by 
employers, subject to State Unemployment Insurance laws and from Federal agencies subject to 
the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program. The statistics include 
both full-time and part-time employees. I measure the growth of employment and population as 
relative annual changes at the end of each year.  
I also report the impact of the tax on personal income, even though the analysis is focused mainly 
on the response of employment. Personal income is measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) as the annual earnings in a given county and is broken down by residence status to account 
for commuters. The BEA reports these statistics going back to 1969 for each county or county 
equivalent in the U.S. This variable is a proxy for the county gross product. 
Chirinko and Wilson (2008) compiled an extensive dataset on state corporate tax variables from 
1964 to 2006. The authors report along with statutory corporate tax rates, valuable statistics on the 
effective corporate tax rates, investment tax credits and federal tax deductibility status by states.  I 
extend the dataset to 2014 by collecting additional information on state corporate tax rates from 
the “Book of the States” and federal deductibility status from state websites. A description of the 
formula used by the authors to compute effective state corporate tax rates is provided in the 
appendix. As for the number of establishments, the Census Bureau through the County Business 
Patterns program releases statistics on the number of production units in each county going back 
to 1975. Finally, information relative to corporate profit accounting rules were obtained from 
Bernthal et al. 2012 in their tax apportionment report for the Wisconsin Department of Revenue.  
5.3 Sample of tax events and border segments  
I survey 340 state tax reforms in the U.S over the period 1969-2014. Of these, 133 were tax cuts 
while 207 are hikes. Given that this paper considers isolated tax events, I further reduce the sample 
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of corporate tax events. In total, 53 tax events (32 hikes and 21 cuts) are considered isolated in this 
study. I respectively consider the response of employment when the tax reform occurs in a state 
using (i) a single sales factor and (ii) a multiple-factor for profits apportionment.  
6. Discussion  
6.1 The effects of the corporate tax on employment growth 
All the tables in the next two sections describe the employment and personal income response to 
the tax. Nonetheless, the ensuing analysis would be based primarily on the employment results. 
Table 2 reports the main impacts on the employment (and income) response to corporate tax 
reforms. Panel 1 relates to the effects of tax changes in general (all tax events). In panel 2, I 
distinguish between tax cuts and hikes. The results indicate that tax changes affect employment 
and income growth in the short-run. The findings in panel 2 suggest that the aggregated effects are 
driven primarily by tax increases. These growth effects are measured relative to control contiguous 
counties. 
The employment growth reduction for a corporate change equals 0.07 percentage point and is 
found to be significant at one percent. This estimate ranges from -0.10 to -0.03 with a 95% 
confidence interval. This aggregate effect is mostly driven by tax hikes which reduce employment 
growth in a county by 0.21 percentage point on average, while tax cuts do not seem to bear any 
significant positive effect on job creation. The table also reports estimates of the incidence on a 
county’s personal income with a growth sensitivity of -0.06 percentage point in general and -0.11 
percentage point for tax hikes.  
The asymmetry of the tax incidence has also been found by a couple of recent empirical works. 
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2014) relate this behavioral asymmetry to the business cycle noting 
that corporate tax cuts only boost economic activities when implemented during recessions, while 
tax increases lead to significant disemployment effects in general. Using micro firm-level 
evidence, Fuest et al. (2017) note that corporate rate increases are associated with a negative and 
significant drop in wages paid by German corporations, while estimates for rate cuts are noisy and 
inconclusive. Overall, this asymmetric response which is at odds with traditional neoclassical 
theory remains a puzzle. I explore in the following section; how formula apportionment regimes 
affect the employment response to corporate tax increases. 
Table 2: Effects of corporate tax changes  
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Growth measured as a relative change, N=1931 
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6.2 The importance of corporate profit accounting rules  
To appreciate the importance of state corporate profit accounting rules this paper considers the tax 
effects within sub-samples of border segments. First, I examine the tax effects along border 
segments where the tax reform occurs in a state using a single sales factor to fraction profits. The 
results in table 3 suggest that the employment response to a tax change wanes down (-0.07 
percentage point vs -0.04 percentage point in general) when employment is not part of the factors 
used to apportion profits. Specifically, as expected based on the conceptual framework, corporate 
tax increases do not seem to significantly reduce employment in this sub-sample. The measured 
estimate for employment is negative and remarkably smaller albeit not significantly different zero. 
In states that use sales to break up profits for taxation, the implicit tax on employment is zero, and 
the location of employment does not alter taxable income as much.  
This result implies that the costs of corporate tax increases, cannot be mitigated through labor 
reallocations. It does not, however, suggest that corporations do not react to corporate tax increases 
in this scenario. There are several other dimensions that could be manipulated by a firm to 
minimize tax liabilities in response to a new policy environment. These include income shifting 
between affiliates that could lower the aggregate profits reported by a multistate business (Klassen 
1998, Mintz & Smart 2003). Plus, other aspects of the tax code such as throwback and throwout 
rules, along with the presence of a combined reporting agreement could all play some role in the 
way firms cushion the losses induced by a rate hike. I also notice for this sub-sample that the 
effects of a corporate tax cut on employment remain imprecise.     
Table 3: Effects with a single sales factor rule 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Growth measured as a relative change, N=341 
Next, I restrict the analysis to the sub-sample of border segments for which treatment occurs in the 
county using a multiple-factor apportionment rule. There is a lot of variation in the weights 
attached to each factor across states. Though there has been a general trend towards assigning more 
importance to sales over time, this was not always the case. I abstract from the magnitude of the 
weight attached to employment in the formula used in each state, due essentially to the data 
structure, which does not allow me to identify these exact weights over the entire period of study.  
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Table 4: Effects with a 3-factor apportionment rule 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Growth measured as a relative change, N=1374 
As evidenced in table 4, I notice a substantial response of labor demand to corporate tax changes 
in states using a three-factor apportionment rule. The estimated effect slightly decreases and equals 
-0.08 percentage point for this sub-sample compared to -0.07 percentage point for the full sample 
of events. Both parameters are significant though not statistically different. In contrast, the 
response of labor demand to a corporate rate increase appears to be more pronounced when the 
hike occurs in a state using an apportionment formula that assigns a positive weight to 
employment.  
The estimate in the latter subgroup equals -0.29 percentage point (vs -0.21 percentage point for 
the full sample) implying that a corporate tax increase reduces the growth of employment by about 
one-third of a percentage point. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of the conceptual 
framework, which emphasize that wherever a multiple-factor rule is in place, the loss in 
profitability caused by a corporate tax increase is more significant in states where a corporation 
employs a larger share of its aggregate workforce. Unfortunately, I am not able to exploit a micro- 
level firm data structure, that would be more appropriate in this context. I also notice that the 
response of employment to a corporate tax cut becomes positive but remains imprecise.  
7. Robustness checks 
This section presents several checks to test the robustness of the measured effects. I investigate the 
validity of the parallel trend assumption between contiguous counties, and other potential pitfalls 
inherent to the methodology of this analysis.     
7.1 Do counties react to state tax changes? 
The empirical strategy used here compares contiguous counties around corporate tax reforms. If 
treated counties react to state policy changes by altering policy instruments that influence business 
activities and the demand for labor, this method will likely underestimate the tax impact on 
employment. I investigate this possibility by regressing the growth of county property and sales 
tax collections, expenditures, and revenue on current and lagged changes in tax rates. The results 
summarized in table 5 suggest that such local government interventions may have occurred. All 
these local public finance aggregates decreased during years of state tax reforms. This could reflect 
a contraction of domestic economic activity, in the aftermath of a tax reform, or counties may just 
be adopting policies to offset the effect of a state tax reform on their economies. As a result, the 
tax impacts measured here might just provide a lower bound of the true response to corporate tax 
changes. 
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Table 5: Corporate tax change and county public finance 
  
 
7.2 Results with closer contiguous pairs 
The spatial discontinuity identification approach requires that contiguous counties share similar 
economic conditions. This draws on the importance of proximity which facilitates the integration 
of local economies. I explore the implications of that hypothesis by analyzing the tax effects in a 
sub-sample of much closer contiguous counties. I use geographic coordinates of county centers of 
gravity to calculate the distance between contiguous pairs. The results in table 6 relate to adjacent 
county pairs located within a hundred miles of each other (distance between their geographic 
centers of gravity). The estimated effects on this sub-sample remain qualitatively similar to those 
reported earlier.  
Table 6: Effects with closer counties (less than 100 miles) 
  
 
7.3 Results with economically similar counties 
An alternative way of checking the importance of the parallel trend assumption is to restrict the 
analysis to contiguous counties that are similar based on observable economic characteristics. 
First, I calculate the difference in the growth of employment, personal income and population 
between a pair of contiguous counties during the years preceding a corporate tax change. Second, 
I construct a “similarity” index that sums up the absolute value of these differences. The higher 
this metric gets, the less similar the counties in a pair are (based on observable socio-economic 
variables). I later exclude the pairs of counties for which the index is above the top decile of the 
similarity distribution. The results in table 7 suggest that restricting the analysis to this sub-sample 
does not qualitatively affect the main tax effects.    
 
 
 
δ(Protax) δ(Saltax) δ(Expend) δ(Revenue)
δ(effcit) -0.037*** -0.06*** -0.079*** -0.079***
(-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02)
l.δ(effcit) 0.004 0.05 0.06** 0.05*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
l2.δ(effcit) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
l3.δ(effcit) 0.005 0.005 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Saltax= Sales taxes, Protax=Property taxes, Expend=Gov. expenditures, revenue= Gov. revenue 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
growth measured relative to contiguous counties. N=1755 
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Table 7: Tax effects with economically similar counties 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
growth measured relative to contiguous counties 
7.4 Results in the presence of combined reporting 
Combined reporting is a provision that requires corporations to report profits for parent and 
affiliated businesses when filing taxes. The goal is to limit income shifting within a corporation. 
In the presence of this legislation, firms cannot escape a corporate tax hike through transfer pricing 
to affiliates and a few other tax avoidance tricks. Therefore, one should expect the employment 
sensitivity to a tax increase to be more pronounced. The results in table 8, support this hypothesis. 
A one percentage point increase in the corporate tax translates into a -0.40 percentage point loss 
of employment growth (vs -0.26 when there is no combined reporting) in states using a multiple 
factor apportionment rule. Plus, for this sub-sample, the response of employment when only sales 
are used to apportion profits is very volatile and imprecise due notably to the limited sample size.         
Table 8: Tax effects with the presence of combined reporting 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Apportionment rule SS= Single Sales, TF=Triple Factor 
7.5 Cross-border spillovers 
One major limitation with this spatial discontinuity identification is the presence of cross-border 
spillovers. These cross-border interactions are particularly concerning in studies that measure 
long-run effects. If businesses react to the tax by shifting activities to the other side of the border 
or households losing their jobs in treated counties commute to the other side of the border to take 
advantage of newly created employment opportunities, then the measured estimates will be biased. 
I explore this possibility by regressing the growth rates of employment, average wages and income 
in a county on current and previous corporate tax rates in the contiguous pair (using the tax events 
that are not considered in my main sample).  
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The results in table 8 do no highlight any significant spatial cross-border spillovers on 
employment. Though county personal income which proxies the gross county product seems to 
react to past corporate policy changes on the other side of the border, the employment result does 
not warrant any spatial interactions that would possibly undermine the consistency of my 
estimates.  
Table 8: Spillovers of tax changes on contiguous counties 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Effcit= Effective tax rate 
Lcemp=log(emp) lcwage=log(wage) and lcpinc=log(Income) in contiguous county peer 
8. Limitations and perspective for future works 
I only estimate short-run tax effects which barely account for the spatial reallocation of capital 
across jurisdictions. By comparing average growth rates over a period of three years, this paper 
measures the immediate change in employment subsequent to the tax change but the long-run 
distortions could be much different than what is described in this study. To estimate the long-run 
economic impact of a tax event using the same identification strategy, I would have to observe 
contiguous counties over a longer time frame which considerably reduces the number of tax 
reforms that would qualify as good policy events.  
Also, there is good reason to believe that the response of employment to a corporate tax increase 
in a state using a multiple-factor apportionment rule, will depend on the weight attached to 
employment. When sales are given substantial importance in the scheme adopted, theory suggests 
that employment should not react as much to tax changes, implying a response that would be 
determined by the magnitude of the weight attached to each factor. Unfortunately, I am not able 
to obtain accurate records on the weight assigned to each factor used by a state going back to 1969. 
The discontinuous effect measured between the two regimes of single-sales vs multiple-factor 
could be masked by a heterogeneity of effects within the second group. I implicitly assumed with 
this approach that there are non-linearities in the relationship between apportionment rules and the 
labor demand incidence of the corporate tax. In contrast, if the true association between these 
variables is linear, then the weight share of employment in the formula should be interacted with 
the magnitude of rate changes to capture the true parameter of interest. As detailed datasets emerge, 
future works on this topic should focus on that consideration.    
Alternatively, micro-level data on the activities of multistate firms would represent the ideal 
dataset for this problematic. One could easily relate variations in a corporation’s labor demand 
across states to corporate tax rates and the weight assigned to employment in each state. The 
aggregate effects measured at the county level could be biased if general equilibrium effects are 
non-negligible. For instance, the true employment loss in the corporate sector could be attenuated 
by the demand for labor in the domestic non-corporate sector. Likewise, the fact that corporate tax 
cuts do not seem to boost county employment does not necessarily imply that corporations do not 
δ(lcemp) δ(lcwage) δ(lcpinc)
effcit -1.09 0.29 0.33(0.97) (0.30) (0.22)
l.effcit 0.76 -1.35 -1.06**(2.04) (1.41) (0.5)
l2.effcit 0.96 2.02 1.37***(1.53) (2.00) (0.32)
l3.effcit -0.9 -1.00 -0.63***(1.14) (0.76) (0.27)
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react to these incentives. This finding could also be contaminated by the demand for labor in other 
sectors of the local economy. Using firm-level data could help mitigate these concerns.      
The investigation carried out in this paper contributes to the debate on the appropriate design for 
the corporate tax code in multiple ways. The recent conversation around the federal corporate tax 
code has been framed around the opportunity of reducing tax avoidance and spur more tax 
collections for public entities. The opportunity of an international formula apportionment rule has 
been presented as a solution to this inefficiency. If tax liabilities of a multinational American 
corporation were to be based on the share of employment, sales, and property in the U.S., this 
would definitely affect the firm’s allocation of employment across countries. Using a single sales 
based rule should technically limit this incentive, but appears more complicated in practice. 
Consolidation of sales requires international cooperation and there are several loopholes such as 
the fungibility of e-commerce sales.  
Last, there is vigorous debate among public economists regarding the opportunity of a corporate 
tax cut. Recently the U.S. adopted a new code that substantially reduces the corporate tax rate. 
While the effects of this reform are still unfolding, the evidence expressed in this paper seems to 
suggest that the rate cut might not automatically translate in more job creation. Just like I notice 
that the negative impact of a corporate tax increase is highly pronounced with the presence of a 
multiple-factor apportionment rule, there must be other features of corporate tax policy that 
mediate the incidence of a business tax cut on labor demand. Going forward, the asymmetric 
puzzle that I discussed in the introduction, should remain a subject of investigation for scholars in 
the field. The evidence against a meaningful positive effect of tax reductions is increasingly getting 
stronger. However, labor market institutions, wage-setting mechanisms or behavioral corporate 
finance analysis could all help explain this oddity.  
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, I study how formula apportionment rules affect the employment sensitivity to state 
corporate tax reforms. I compare the response of labor demand when the reform occurs in a state 
using a single sales-factor to the incidence when multiple factors are used to break down the share 
of profits that will be taxed.     
In a first step, I found that corporate tax cuts do not bear a significant effect on employment, while 
corporate tax hikes reduce the growth of labor demand in the short-run. This result is consistent 
with a recent set of papers (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky 2014, Fuest et al. 2017) which also noticed 
similar asymmetric effects.  My findings indicate that a one percentage point corporate tax change 
reduces employment growth by 0.07 percentage point. This result is driven by corporate tax 
increases as a one percentage point business tax hike reduces job creation by 0.21 percentage point. 
This effect varies with the apportionment formula adopted. When states apportion profits based 
off a single sales-factor, the incidence of a corporate tax hike on employment decreases 
substantially to -0.03 percentage point and is not statistically significant. In contrast, in states using 
a multiple-factor apportionment where employment is given some weight in the determination of 
taxable income, the impact of a one percentage point business tax increase amplifies to -0.29 
percentage.  These results were derived using a spatial discontinuity identification strategy that 
compares contiguous counties straddling state borderlines around business tax reforms. It allows 
me to control for time-variant determinants of employment at the local level. However, I explore 
the validity of this assumption in the robustness checks.  
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There is widespread evidence supporting the claim that formula apportionment rules in corporate 
profit taxation affect incentives to shift income (Gordon & Wilson 1986, Nielsen & Raimondos-
Moller 2003, Hines 2009) through transfer pricing notably. Little documented though, is the 
impact these state rules have on investment (Gupta & Hofmann 2003) or employment (Goolsbee 
& Maydew 2001, Clausing 2016), notwithstanding a well-established theoretical background. The 
results described in this paper complement Goolsbee & Maydew 2001, who noticed that 
apportionment rules affect manufacturing employment and Clausing 2016 who did not observe 
any significant association between the two. The findings also carry some implications regarding 
the appropriate apportionment rule to adopt. Policymakers should be aware of the fact that, when 
employment is included in the set of factors that define taxable income, there is an implicit tax on 
employment, which limits the ability to raise tax rates without introducing other distortions on the 
labor market.   
One major caveat of this study is that, due to the limitation of the data structure, I am not able to 
study the dynamic effects of the corporate tax incidence using the same identification strategy. 
Given that the tax triggers reallocations of factors across the economy, one should expect changes 
in the long-run to differ from short-run impacts. Also, the spatial discontinuity approach features 
a strong internal validity but is limited for external extrapolation to a different context. 
Future research on this topic could be expanded along two avenues. First, upcoming empirical 
studies should focus on uncovering the absence of a meaningful positive effect of a corporate tax 
cut on employment. It would be interesting to explore how labor market institutions and the 
bargaining power of labor mediate the association between corporate tax cuts and labor demand 
or wages. Second, future works on this subject should examine the opportunity of an international 
apportionment formula. Though using employment as a criterion to determine taxable income, 
could hurt labor demand, it might be interesting to explore how effective a sales-only 
apportionment rule could get. Last, micro-level data on the activities of multistate firms would 
represent the ideal dataset for this problematic. One could easily relate variations in a corporation’s 
labor demand across states to corporate tax rates and the weight assigned to employment in each 
state.      
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Summary statistics of main variables  
Variable Description  Mean Std. Dev. 
     
Employment Employment  overall 44917.91 164338.3 
 between  159964.7 
 within  37477.2 
Effcit Effective state 
corporate tax 
rates 
overall 0.0599248 0.025454 
 between  0.022244 
 within  0.012379 
Establishments Number of 
establishments 
overall 41.89928 71.43846 
 between  59.21136 
 within  36.86805 
CIT Statutory state 
corporate tax 
rates 
overall 0.0592841 0.030204 
 between  0.027939 
 within  0.011487 
Population County 
population 
overall 83310.55 274210.3 
 between  269515.1 
 within  50137.87 
Income County personal 
Income 
overall 1990945 8893925 
 between  7228974 
 within  3,773,177 
 
 
Figure A1: Map of U.S. contiguous counties 
  
(61.4511,341.005]
(47.9091,61.4511]
(39.637,47.9091]
[8.67688,39.637]
No data
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Appendix B: Note on state effective corporate tax rates 
The corporate effective tax rates used in this paper are obtained from Chirinko and Wilson (2006). 
On top of the statutory corporate income tax, most states provide firms with instruments that reduce 
the tax burden on profits. Chirinko and Wilson considered the deductibility of federal corporate 
taxes from state tax liabilities to construct an effective corporate tax variable. While some states 
allow full deductibility of federal corporate taxes from state taxable income and other allow no 
deductibility at all, Iowa and Missouri allow only 50% deductibility.  
Denoting the provision for federal tax deductibility in state s over period t as 
,
{1.0,0.5,0.0}s tυ = , 
the effective corporate tax rate in state s in period t is defined by: 
                                                                             
, , ,F
, , ,
(1 )E S L S Es t t s t s tτ τ τ υ= −                                                          (B1) 
where ,L Stτ denotes the statutory corporate tax rate in state s over period t and 
,F
,
E
s tτ represents the 
effective corporate tax rate at the federal level over the same period. Considering that in many 
states the corporate tax schedule is not linear, the authors measure ,L Stτ with the marginal legislated 
tax rate for the highest bracket. 
 
Similarly, given that state corporate tax payments are fully deductible from federal tax liabilities, 
the effective corporate tax rate at the federal level is given by:  
                                                                                 
,F ,F ,S
, ,
(1 )E L Es t t s tτ τ τ= −                                                           (B2) 
Using equations (1) and (2), Chirinko and Wilson suggested that the effective corporate income 
tax rates at the state and federal levels are systematically related. Solving for the effective corporate 
tax rates respectively at the state and federal levels yields the final expressions: 
                                                                              
,S L,F
, ,,S
, L,S ,
, ,
(1 )
(1 )
L
s t s t tE
s t L F
s t s t t
τ υ τ
τ
υ τ τ
−
=
−
                                                      (B3) 
                                                                              
,F L,S
,,F
, L,S ,
, ,
(1 )
(1 )
L
t s tE
s t L F
s t s t t
τ τ
τ
υ τ τ
−
=
−
                                                      (B4) 
 
Collecting data on state and federal corporate tax rates along with state provisions regarding federal 
tax deductibility, I extended the state effective corporate tax series computed by Chirinko and 
Wilson from 2006 to 2014. 
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Appendix C: Two-way clustering by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) 
Consider situations where each observation may belong to more than one “dimension” of clusters. 
For instance, if there are two dimensions of clusters, each individual i can belong to a cluster g ∈ 
{1, 2, ...,G}, as well as to a cluster h ∈ {1, 2, ...,H}, and we have: 
                                                                                      
'xigh igh ighy uβ= +                                                            (C1) 
where we assume that for i j≠  
' ' ' '
E[ | x , x ] 0igh ighjg h jg hu u =  unless 'g g= or 'h h=  
Errors belonging to the same group (along either dimension) are correlated. Assuming that the two 
clusters are non-nested, the disturbance variance-covariance matrix V[u|X]Ω =  cannot be 
expressed as a diagonal matrix. A consistent two-way cluster-robust estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix of the OLS estimator is given by: 
                                                                       
1 1ˆˆ ˆV[ ]=(X X) B(X X)β − −′ ′
                                                  (C2) 
where 'ˆ ˆ ˆB X (uu .S )XGH′=  and  S S S SGH H G G H∩= + − . 
SH is an N × N indicator matrix with ijth entry equal to one if the ith and jth observation belong to 
the same cluster h ∈ {1, 2,...,H}, SG denotes a similar N × N indicator matrix with ijth entry equal 
to one if the ith and jth observation belong to the same cluster g ∈ {1, 2,...,G}, and SG H∩  refers to 
an N × N indicator matrix with ijth entry equal to one if the ith and jth observation belong to both 
the same cluster g ∈ {1, 2,...,G} and the same cluster h ∈ {1, 2, ...,H}. 
 
 
